A. B. Alcott and J. Dewey: Leibniz’s Monadology as Background of Thought

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[Abstract]

This article connects Alcott’s and Dewey’s ideologically by highlighting Leibniz’s influence in the background of their thought. In this attempt, influences of “philosophy of the mind” related to self-knowledge in Leibniz’s monadology are extracted from the “personalistic idealism” of Alcott and the “organic idealism” of Dewey.

In their ideas, there is a closeness of the logic on mediating between the individual and the universal in Leibniz’s monadology, as well as his view of the world being organically unified, which recognizes self as a connection with others and the world.

Although Dewey tried to interpret it in the context of Hegelianism, he found out the logic of unity with individual and universal in Leibniz’s monadology, and relates its organic connection with the way of knowledge.

Alcott tried to construct a society based on personalism, and in his awareness of the issues, there is an attempt to unify the individuals and the whole, which Dewey found in Leibniz’s thought. The society of “personality” of Alcott was envisioned as a dynamic unified relationship between individuals and others.

Leibniz, Alcott, and Dewey shared their attempts to unify by the interaction between the individual and the whole.

Keywords: John Dewey, Bronson Alcott, Leibniz, Monadology, self-knowledge

Introduction

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was influenced by posterity throughout the natural sciences, humanities, and social sciences. In the history of philosophy, he is considered as a philosopher of rationalism of the early modern period, his works are disseminated by confronting Descartes, Spinoza’s thought critically, confronting Locke’s theory of British empirical theory.

John Dewey’s earlier thought was influenced by Leibniz, a fact highlighted in Dewey’s writing, “Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding.”

In his work, Dewey attempted to introduce Leibniz’s thought based on a favorable interpretation, which was rare in Britain and the United States. Dewey found logic in Leibniz’s thought that meditation is necessary to mediate between individuals and universality and supported Leibniz’s world view of self as an organic unification presuming connection with others and the world.

Prior studies on Dewey’s work have concluded that Leibniz played a spoken role for Dewey’s early “organic idealism” and reinforced the influence of Hegelianism on Dewey. [1]

On the contrary, it is difficult to directly draw an influential relationship between Amos Bronson Alcott and Leibniz. Alcott read the translation of Leibniz’s work [2], which was introduced in “The Journal of Speculative

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Philosophy,” edited by William Torrey Harris, and may have found it appealing to his thought process. Alcott’s ideas later in life were to strengthen the character of “personalistic idealism,” [3] sharing an awareness of the issues was recognized between his definition of “personality” and the argument of “personality identity” developed in Leibniz’s works.

Dewey said, “... in a broad sense, the work of Kant and of his successors, was the discovery of a method which should justify the objective idealism of Leibniz, and which in its history has more than fulfilled this task.” [4] In his last chapter, ”Criticism and Conclusion” of Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding, Dewey positioned Leibniz as a pioneer of Kant’s work. On the contrary, the New England transcendentalist Alcott tried to overcome Locke’s thought, in particular the denial of the innate idea, by using Kant’s transcendental thought.

On the premise of such relation of the three philosophers, one of the tasks to ideally connect Alcott and Dewey highlights Leibniz’s influence in the ideological background of both. Here, the author focuses on the “philosophy of the mind” related to self-knowledge (self-consciousness) in Leibniz’s monadology through Alcott’s thoughts of “Organic idealism” and Dewey’s thoughts of “Organismal idealism.”

1 Leibniz’s personality theory behind the criticism of Locke

Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding was published in 1765 after his death. [5] As evident from the title, this work was written as a critical review of Rock’s “Essays Concerning the Human Understanding.” In Rock’s work, a dialogue that occurs between Filarate (who supports Rock’s views) and Theophill (who supports Leibniz’s views) corresponds to the “human intelligence theory” of Locke’s Essays Concerning the Human Understanding.

It is well known that Locke denied innate ideas. According to his discussion, “in the mind” meant ”understanding.” [6] He explained, “[t]o say that a notion is imprinted on the mind, and that the mind is ignorant of it and has never paid attention to it, is to make this impression nothing.” [7] From here the following words are derived, “Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu.” To this idea of Locke, it is well known that Leibniz added to this word “nisi ipse intellectus.” [8]

One of the arguments derived from this epistemology was “identity of personality.” Locke said, “[w]hat makes a man be himself to himself is sameness of consciousness, so personal identity depends entirely on that.” [9] He attempted to explain the personality’s identity by the first person’s “memory.” Identity of personality exists, ”[f]or as far as any thinking being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness that he had of it at first, and with the same consciousness he has of his present actions, so far is he the same personal self.” [10] Locke aimed to separate personality from its real entity using this argument. [11]

Leibniz criticized the Locke’s explanation that personal identity was restricted to conscious representations, which are based on memories. Leibniz criticized not only Locke’s theory of perception but also his theory of personality. In New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding, Leibniz argued that consciousness would not be a sufficient enough condition for an identification of personality. His critical point was that Locke’s memory simply meant the recalled memory representation and its ”latency” is denied. [12]

It is well known that Leibniz attributed the representational ability to the monad. In Monadology, the definition of a representation of a monad is stated as follows: [t]he passing condition, which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unit or in the simple substance, is nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be distinguished from Apperception or Consciousness, as will afterwards appear. In this matter the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for it treats as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not consciously aware. This has also led them to believe that minds alone are Monads, and that there are no souls of animals nor other Entelechies. Thus, like the crowd, they have failed to distinguish between a prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death, which has made them fall again into the Scholastic prejudice of souls.
entirely separate [from bodies] and has even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the opinion that souls are mortal. [13]

According to his words, "representation" is not always accompanied by consciousness and as "transitive," the representation includes change. Thus, the representation was not limited to time and space. The expression "no monad has a window" means that the monad is an individual existence.

Leibniz recognized the potential of self as an existence structure of monad that is not conscious as a first person in Locke's theory. In other words, the representation had an opaque phase of consciousness of unconsciousness, and there was a limit to self-consciousness that relied on conscious representation and memory representation. In the mind philosophy including monadic logic, Leibniz criticized Rock stating, "it is a great source of error to believe that there is no perception in the soul besides those of which it is conscious." [14]

To think of a monad as a starting point of the mind philosophy, it is important to understand what monad is. In conclusion, Leibniz regarded the mind as a monad, not a real substrate. However, for Leibniz it was not a separate entity, similar to the thought by Descartes, for example, but as a relationship in which one envelops it while wrapping it in the other. He said, "I believe there is always an exact correspondence between the body and the soul, and since I employ the impressions of the body of which we are not conscious, whether awake or asleep, in order to prove that the soul has in itself similar one." [15] In other words, there is a mind-body monism. In this respect, it is also different from Locke's theory that regarded the entity as the whole image of the individual ideas.

2 Interpretation of Leibniz philosophy by Dewey

Dewey's *Leibniz's New Essays Conserving the Human Understanding* was published in 1888. [16] At this time, Dewey was influenced by the Hegelian George Sylvester Morris. It was Morris who introduced Dewey to Leibniz's research. In 1886, Morris organized the compilation of the *German philosophical classics series* and asked Dewey to write about Leibniz in the series. (*Leibniz's New Essays Conserving the Human Understanding* was Volume 7 of that series.) As the title indicates, this work was a commentary on Leibniz's *New Essays Conserving the Human Understanding*; nevertheless, this work had the character of "Leibniz theory" by Dewey, which included reference to Leibniz's other writings and ideas such as "pantheism" and "monadology." In this work, Dewey highly appreciated Leibniz's role in the German philosophy of the 17th century and insisted on the superiority of German philosophy over the British empirical theory represented by Locke.

In the following discussion, the author examines Leibniz's understanding of "monadology" and "self-consciousness" from Dewey's work on Leibniz in relation to the theme of this article.

2.1 Monadology

In Chapter 3 "The Problem, and its solution," Dewey acknowledged the significance of Leibniz's "Monadology." As seen in criticism of Spinoza's pantheism by Leibniz, he envisioned a unified universe based on individuals without abstracting diversity and differences. [17]

In the discussion on "the mirror of an indestructable universe," Dewey used the concept of "expression" to explain the action that monads project. As for this point, he explained, "...the ability, thus to represent the world is called 'perception,' and thus Leibniz attributes perception to all the monads. This is not to be understood as a conscious representation of reality to itself (for this the term 'apperception' is reserved), but it signifies that the very essence of monad is to produce states which are not its own peculiar possessions, but which reflected the facts and relations of the universe." [18]

Although it is said that the image displayed on the monad is not a real conscious representation itself, it is understood that Dewey's interest in monads was directed toward unity and universal mediation. Dewey continued to explain, "[t]he monad is an individual, but its whole content, its objectivity or reality, is the summation of the
universe which it represents. It is individual, but whatever marks it as actual is some reproduction of the world. His reconciliation of the principles of individuality and universality is contained in the following words. ’Each monad contains within itself an order corresponding to that of the universe, — indeed, the monads represent the universe in infinite ways, all different, and all true, thus multiplying the universe as many times as is possible, approaching the divine as near of which it is capable.’ The monad is individual, for it represents reality in its own way, from its own point of view.’ [19]

Dewey linked the concept of ’organic’ to the ”expression” of this monad world, ”it is the idea of organism of life, which is radical to the thought of Leibniz.” [20]

2.2 Self-knowledge

Self-knowledge is mainly discussed in Chapter 10 ”Nature and extent of knowledge.” Dewey evaluated Leibniz’s epistemological theory rather than Locke’s, from the standpoint that problems concerning knowledge are required not in identity with ideas and subjects, but in the idea itself. [21]

Leibniz stated, ”the highest form of knowledge, therefore, is self-consciousness. This bears the same relation to necessary truth that the latter bear to experience. ”Knowledge of necessary and eternal truths” continuing, ”distinguishes us from simple animals, and makes us have reason and science, elevating us to the knowledge of ourselves. We are thus developed to self-consciousness, and in being conscious of ourselves we are conscious of being, of substance, of the simple, of the spiritual, of God. And again, he said that ”those that know necessary truths are rational spirits, capable of self-consciousness, of recognizing what is termed Ego, substance, and monad. Thus, they are rendered capable of demonstrative knowledge.” ”We are innate to ourselves, and since we are beings, being is innate to us, for knowledge of it is implicit in that which we have of ourselves.”

Knowledge may be regarded as an ascending series of four terms. The first is constituted by sensations associated together in such a way that a relation of antecedence and consequence exists between them; this is ”experience.” The second term comes into existence when we connect these experiences, not by mere relations of ”consecution,” but by their conditions, by the principle of causality, and especially by that of enough reason, which connects them with the supreme intelligence, God; this stage is science. The third is knowledge of the axioms and necessary truths in and themselves, not merely as involved in science. The fourth is self-consciousness, the knowledge of intelligence in its intimate and universal nature, by which we know God, the mind, and all real substance. In the order of the time the stage of experience is first, and that of self-consciousness last. But in the lowest stage there are involved the others. The progress of knowledge consists in the development or unfolding of this implicit content, till intelligent spirit, activity, is clearly revealed as the source and condition of all.” [22]

According to Dewey’s understanding, Leibniz positioned self-knowledge as the final stage of knowledge, but was not a disconnection between lower knowledge and higher knowledge, but upper knowledge was ”knowing spirit” and ”known universe.” The degree of discovering organic unity between the two is a developmentally disclosed awareness. In relation to the existential structure of monads, there was no temporal and spatial limit in the universe projected onto it. However, as Dewey acknowledged, how to know (how to reflect) was not uniform. Leibniz discussed this idea using the concept of ”petites perceptions.” The degree of the identification of the representation depends on the extent to which it is subjective to the content and action of the representation. Because of the diversity and the difference on the premise of the whole universe, as well as the unification of the unity, the discovery of the linkage of the universe enhances the microscopic representation to self-knowledge. Dewey found an essence of the democratic society, claiming, they ”are a true democracy, in which each citizen was sovereignty. To admit external influences acting upon them is to surrender their independence, to deny their sovereignty …” What each sovereign citizen of the realm of reality
expresses is precisely law. Each is an embodiment in its own way of the harmony, the order of the whole kingdom. Each is sovereign because it is dynamic law, law, which is no longer abstract, but has realized itself in life." [23]

3 Leibniz’s influence on Alcott

As mentioned in the Introduction section, it is possible that the interaction between Alcott and Leibniz was indirect, through the friendship with Harris and Hedge. [24] However, recent studies of Bernard Schmidt on personalism suggest an influential relationship between the two. Schmidt discussed Alcott’s philosophy in relation to European personalism in “American Literary Personalism; Emergence and Decline.” In this work, he regarded Leibniz as an ideological pioneer of personality. [25]

With reference to Schmidt’s research, this section discusses that Alcott’s view of personality has something in common with the idea of personality in Leibniz’s monadology.

3.1 Personalism and Leibniz

What is generally ignored by Leibniz’s non-window theory of monads is that individual self is closely related. Leibniz said; “[a]nd compounds are in this respect analogous with [symbolisent avec] simple substances. For all is a plenum (and thus all matter is connected together) and in the plenum every motion has an effect upon distant bodies in proportion to their distance, so that each body not only is affected by those which are in contact with it and in some way feels the effect of everything that happens to them, but also is mediately affected by bodies adjoining those with which it itself is in immediate contact. Wherefore it follows that this intercommunication of things extends to any distance, however great. And consequently everybody feels the effect of all that takes place in the universe, so that he who sees all might read in each what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened or shall happen, observing in the present that which is far off as well in time as in place: [sympnoia panta], as Hippocrates said. But a soul can read in itself only that which is there represented distinctly; it cannot all at once unroll everything that is enfolded in it, for its complexity is infinite.” [26]

His words indicate that in individuals with limited areas where humans function, everyone is influenced by others. In terms of personalism, Leibniz’s social interaction is a key concept.

In his personalistic view, social interaction was a key concept. Emmauel Mounier, the foremost thinker in the French School of Personalism, said that no person is truly “isolated,” and that society has a certain holistic personality that must be trained to be morally alert and ethically sensitive. [27]

The effort to achieve truth and justice is a collective effort. Not that a million consciences necessarily produce a higher consciousness than does a single strict conscience. Numbers, before they are organized, may only produce mediocrity, confusion, weariness, or passion. And at the first attempt, organization often does not more than harden the mass emotions thus brought together. It is only through their personalization that numbers achieve human significance, insure free cooperation and exchange of gifts, and bring under control the follies and mystifications into which individuals are led through separation. [28]

For Leibniz, “the knowledge of eternal and necessary truth,” was a clear moral law provided by God, and this created a social structure that allows humans to live in peace and harmony. [29] Leibnitz knew that in creating this world, God recognized the best world out of all possible worlds by God’s omniscience, selected this by good intentions, and realized this with omnipotence (Principle of the Best/Principle of Perfection). [30] In addition, in connection with the monad, he said: “[t]hese characteristics correspond to what in the created Monads forms the ground or basis, to the faculty of Perception and to the faculty of Appetition... A created thing is said to act outwardly in so far as it has perfection, and to suffer [or be passive, patir] in relation to another, in so far as it is imperfect. Thus activity [action] is attributed to a Monad, in so far as it has distinct perceptions, and...
passivity [passion] in so far as its perceptions are confused." [31] In this case, perfection or imperfection meant that the monad had a clear representation or a crowded representation.

Leibniz regarded a monad with a clear representation (conscious representation) as a spirit, and he divided the living thing and the animal with this spirit. He regarded the spirit that rose to the recognition of God through self-consciousness (self-knowledge) in himself as "l’esprit, l’âme raisonnable," and that was used as an index for separating animals from humans. In this way, Leibniz’s personality theory explained the latter with living organisms, animals, and humans, depending on the way in which representations are expressed.

The completed state of "Personification" of successor personalists is a "rational spirit" in the Leibnizian sense, and it brings a reflexional representation to an animal conscious representation in the process. This logic can also be found in Alcott’s thought.

### 3.2 Leibniz’s element in Alcott’s personalism

Alcott was regarded as a person of prestige of personality in the United States as he was the first person who used the word “personalism” for the first time there in 1857 [32], and he influenced Borden Parker Bowne, a central personality thinker in the region, through George Holmes Howison. [33]

In Alcott’s work, the term “personality” or “person” appeared from the 1860s to the later years. These terms were used as descriptions related to human recognition and existence. In other words, what was called “spiritual” in human experience was a state where other work was governed by personality. Human’s cognitive abilities were instinct, sensation, memory, understanding, fantasy, reason, imagination, conscience, and personality. Alcott tried to explain this hierarchical structure as “Life’s Ladder.”

"Theology and philosophy unbind the ligaments that chain the soul down to earth and assist her flight towards the foreign good. There is an instinct or tendency of the mind upwards, which shows a natural endeavor to recover and raise ourselves from our present sensual and low condition into a state of higher order and purity. The perceptions of sense are gross, but even in the senses there is a difference. Though harmony and proportion are not objects of sense, yet the eye and the ear are organs by means wherewith the soul may apprehend the one and the other. By experiments of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of the soul, and from them, whether by gradual evolution or ascent, sense supplies images for memory. These become subjects for fancy to work upon. Reason considers and judges of imagination; and all these acts of reason become new objects of understanding. In this scale, each lower faculty is a step that leads to one above it; and the uppermost naturally leads to the Deity, who is rather the object of intellectual knowledge than even of the discursive faculty, not to mention the sensitive.

The stairway of nature conducts through the visible world to the second flight, the mind, and this in continuation of the first — from the level landing-place of things rising upwards, on the several faculties, to the open dome of Spirit, displaying, as we rise, the successive stories and apartments of the vast temple of Being." [34]

As Leibniz distinguished between the monad and the spirit by the discovery of the representation, the epistemological existence theory of Alcott’s personality was similar in that it hierarchically depicted the epistemology in relation to ontology. Furthermore, the ideological similarity of Alcott with Leibniz’s monadology was found in Alcott’s “personality” concept, which related to Emmanuel Mounier’s “The Process of Personalization.”

For Alcott, “personalization” was a process of detoxifying the harmful effects of individual selfishness and thereby “separating” from God. Alcott thought that the "person" was a soul-like quality or spiritual thing, which he defined as "universal and common to men — all that is central and absolute in each one." [35] On the contrary, "individuality" was "that which is particular and special, which distinguishes one person from another." Passive meaning had been made as preventing universal uniqueness of mind and unity with God. In his lecture on “individualism” at Concord School of Philosophy in later
years, Alcott talked about this key concept: "separation from a oneness with God—a becoming divided from Him and willfully pursuing the path that leads away from Him." [36] For him, individuality led to social bias and unfair behavior, and human selfishness given to individuality was ultimately a valuable institution for mankind. According to his explanation, as a result of failure of harmony with God and loss of relationship with others, human beings had been led to "separateness from good and truth and beauty" and humans are enemies to good deeds, leading to the personality of the devil, "who isolates himself with a hell of denial and evil, of oppositeness to the highest." [37]

On the contrary, "personality" opposed to this "individuality" brings empathic submission in society. He said, "Individuals repel. Persons meet. And only as one's personality is sufficiently overpowering to dissolve the other's individualism, can the parties flow together and become one. But individuals have no power of the sort. "...But the freed personal mind meets all, is apprehended by all, by the least cultivated, the most gifted; magazines all; is the spell-binder, the liberator of everyone." [38] An individual in the society of Alcott's view was an individual having a personality as a property distinguishable from others and individuality as a link and interaction property with others, and depending on that degree, it was spiritual. It was a duality of the characteristics of individuals drawn by Leibniz in the world of monadology, and furthermore it was also the way for Dewey to regard it as a model of "true democracy," in that individual and universality interacted.

Alcott was able to contribute his ideas and practices to the growing impulse of personalism in America. By imaginative and logical development of his personality with the proper attention to the demands of spirit, a person will create meaning in life. Alcott wrote in his journal, "[t]hr Person is the pre-supposition of all things and beings," and "Nothing were without this premise." [39]

**Conclusion: Inheritance of thought from Leibniz by Alcott and Dewey**

There is no distinction between inner and outer in Leibniz's existential structure of the monad. Although it is thoroughly individual, and there is no distinction between inside and outside, potentially sociality is latent in person. From such a premise, Leibniz criticized Locke based on personality identity only to the consciousness (the representation) spoken in the first person and the memory. For him, the world of monads was not a center of conscious mind, which was told in the first person like Locke, but a place of interaction with others.

Although Dewey tried to interpret this in the context of Hegelism, he found the logic of unification with unity in such Leibniz's monadology, and related its organic connection with the way of knowing and understanding.

Alcott, thinking between Leibniz and Dewey's time periods, thought of social construction based on personalism, and it was important for him at that time that Dewey found exactly what he found in Leibniz's thought that was mediation of individual with the whole. The world of "personality" of Alcott was drawn as a dynamic unified relationship such that individuals (individuals) conceptually conceive others, as in Leibniz's monadologic world.

This article connects Leibniz's thought under the background of Alcott's and Dewey's, but only similarity of ideas with Alcott and Leibniz as evidence, it was impossible to include Alcott in "Leibniz's children." However, both tried to mediate with the whole based on individuals in each era, and they explored the way, that is not to represent the whole to the whole, but also to let the individual dissolve the whole.

**Notes**

1. For example, Furuya considered initial Dewey's theory of Leibnitz, gave positive evaluation to the tendency to be regarded as "residue of Hegelism" at the ideological development stage of Dewey, "Leipnitz and Hegel gave initial Dewey It was an idea and a philosophy as a tool of social reform."
2. The first translation of Monadology introduced to the United States by transcendentalist Frederic Henry Hedge in 1867, the first issue of "Speculative Philosophy."

3. In connection with this, Schmidt points out as follows. "Personalism has garnered far less attention than the closely related school of transcendentalism. This is unfortunate because of its importance in the development of American thought and contemporary philosophy". (Schmidt(2004), p.iii.)


5. Although the completion of the manuscript was in 1703, this work was Leibniz's later years' writings, even though he was abandoned for publication because the enemy rock had passed away in 1704. This work is beyond the nature of the mere criticism of locks in that Leibniz's own ideas are interspersed with everywhere as well as being a refutation against Rock's epistemology. In fact, the great work comparable to this in quantitative terms of his writings is only the Theodicee sur la bonte de Dieu, la libertede le homme et le originedu mal.

6. Locke, John (1999), E1-2-5(p.49) ※ An Essay concerning Human Understanding is abbreviated as "E", and the Numbers are in order of volume and section. (Japanese translation by Haruhiko Otsuki(1972 a), p.45.)

7. Locke, John (1999), E1-2-5(p.49) (Japanese translation by Haruhiko Otsuki (1972 a), p.44.) Leibniz also tells Philalethes (Locke) as follows in New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding. "Could we suppose either two distinct and incommunicable consciousness acting by turns in the same body, the one constantly during the day, the other by night, or that the same consciousness acts at intervals in two different bodies of it. It matters not that this same consciousness which affects two different bodies, and these consciousness which affect the same body at different times, belong the one to the same immaterial substances, which introduce these different consciousness into these bodies, since personal identity would equally be determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness were attached to same individual immaterial substance or not." (Leibniz (1896), NE 2-27-23(pp.254-255) ※ New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding is abbreviated as "N," and the Numbers are in order of volume and section. (Japanese translation by Suguru Yoneyama(1987), p. 216).


11. He exemplified the limbs being cut off, the dual personality, the possibility of the soul's reincarnation, the possibility of change in composition of the entity, the possibility that two persons will live in one body, the possibility that one personality will change to two bodies. Then he denied the foundation of the personality on the real substrate. (Locke, John (1999), E 2-27-11 ~ 14(pp.320-323)/ Japanese translation by Haruhiko Otsuki(1972 b), p. 315-321)

12. As Rock's memory is limited to the extent that it is possible to grasp past experiences by consciousness, not only Leibnitz but also many criticisms against placing it as a basis for personality identification. For example, memory that kept for a certain period included thinning, incarnation, how to deal with examples of dual personality. Leibniz brings out the testimony of the third person (criterion of the third person) and insists that not only "internal appearance" of consciousness but also "external appearance" (apparences externes) play an important role in self-identification. (Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1896), NE 2-27-9(pp.244-245) (Japanese translation by Suguru Yoneyama(1987), p.217.)


15. Ibid.
16. This work of Dewey consists of the following chapter, Chap.1 The Man, Chap.2 Sources of his philosophy, Chap.3 The Problem and its Solution, Chap.4 Locke and Leibniz—Innate Ideas, Chap.5 Sensation and Experience, Chap.6 The Impulses and the Will, Chap.7 Matter and its Relation to Spirit, Chap.8 Material Phenomena and their Reality Chap.9 Some Fundamental Conception, Chap.10 The Nature and Extent of Knowledge, Chap.11 The Theology of Leibniz, Chap.12 Criticism and Conclusion. (in Dewey (1961).)

17. Dewey Said; "Leibniz recognized the unphilosophic character of the recourse to a deus ex machina as clearly as Spinoza, and yet did not accept his solution. To find out why he did not is the problem of the historian of thought. The one cause which stands out above all others is that in the unity of Spinoza all difference, all distinction, is lost—The problem is to reconcile difference in unity, not to swallow up difference in a blank oneness— to reconcile the individual with the universe, not to absorb him." (Dewey, J., (1961), pp.48-49.)


19. Ibid., p.57.

20. Ibid., p.34.

21. In the case of Locke, Dewey considers that confusion between "identification of ideas" and "identification of idea and object" is observed, and as a result of division of idea and object, we cannot explain the recognition well.


23. Ibid., p.60.

24. Harris points out that Alcott shared problem consciousness with the philosopher of Spinoza "Reason of the Reason" by accepting the philosophy of Protonos and Proclus among the philosophers of New Platonism. (Sanborn, F. B. & Harris, W. T. (1893), pp.579-580)


27. Mounier, Emmanuel (1952), p.84.

28. Ibid., p.84.


30. Ibid., p.25 (Japanese translation, p.268) (Discourse on Metaphysics, Chap.2-4, 35, 36.)

31. Ibid., p.23 (Japanese translation, pp.262-263.)


34. Alcott, A. B. (1877), pp.135-137.

35. Bridgman, E. S. (1940), p.31.

36. Ibid., p.129.

37. Ibid., p.130.

38. Alcott, A. B. (1868), pp.77-78.


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